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Abstract  
 
In this study we develop a model to analyse the interplay between social media coverage, 
financial reporting opacity and stock return co-movement. Our model predicts a negative 
association between social media coverage and co-movement, because social media coverage 
lowers the information acquisition and processing cost for investors and therefore facilitates 
the incorporation of firm-specific information into stock price, which leads to reduced co-
movement. It is also predicted that such effect is more pronounced among firms with higher 
financial reporting opacity. Using data collected from Seeking Alpha, the largest social media 
platform providing “third-party generated” financial commentary and analysis in the US, we 
find results consistent with the predictions of the model. Our study has significant policy 
implications, because social media has become an increasingly important channel of 
information production and dissemination. 
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1. Introduction 
 
In this study, we develop a model to analyze the interplay between social media coverage, 
financial reporting opacity and the extent to which stock return co-moves with industry and 
market return (co-movement). Higher information acquisition and processing costs may 
significantly reduce the number of informed investors, which in turn deters firm-specific 
information from being fully capitalised into stock prices (Grossman and Stiglitz, 1980), 
resulting in high co-movement between stock return and market/industry return. However, 
financial analysis written and posted by registered users on social media might have “global 
access” on the Internet and significantly decrease the information collection and processing 
costs, which facilitates the incorporation of more information, particularly firm-specific 
information, into stock price. We suggest that the coverage of public firms on social media 
plays at least two roles:  
 Firstly, the coverage may help investors become familiar with the firm covered at a low 
cost, resulting in reduced information asymmetry and better investor awareness. Given 
that there are an increasing number of informed investors who can exploit their private 
information when they trade with uninformed counterparts, firm-specific information is 
likely to be incorporated into stock price to a greater extent;  
 Secondly, prior research shows that contagion is an important type of social influence that 
takes the form of direct interaction with others in a network, and such influence can 
explain a wide range of economic activities (Bikhchandani et al., 1998; Ivković and 
Weisbenner, 2007). In the financial market, interaction with other market participants is 
critical in the contagion of value relevant information, as people pay more attention to 
ideas or facts that are reinforced by interaction, ritual and symbols (Shiller, 1999).1 In the 
Internet era, social media is becoming an important platform where individuals can 
                                                        
1 For example, Shiller and Pound (1989) find that almost all investors who recently purchased a stock had their 
attention drawn to it through direct communication with others. 
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exchange ideas on investment with others, because it allows registered user not only to 
write and read articles, but also to post commentaries in response to an existing piece of 
information. Those who post commentaries may provide distinctive perspectives or 
alternative insights, and can suggest corrections or even point out flaws in the original 
article. Not unreasonably, an article followed by many commentaries is expected to 
attract more attention from a broad audience. Therefore, the coverage on social media 
enables more investors to better interact with others and understand the implication of 
released information, which results in such firm-specific information being fully 
impounded into stock price, leading to reduced return co-movement. 
 
It is recognized that financial reports are an important source of firm-specific information that 
is widely used by investors (Bushman and Smith, 2001; Lambert, 2001). According to Jin 
and Myers (2006), (financial reporting) opacity, which represents the lack of information that 
precludes investors from determining the fair value of a firm, makes it easier for managers to 
conceal self-serving behavior such as rent seeking or asset diversion.2  This implies that the 
opacity limits the flow of firm-specific information to the market, which leads to higher 
return co-movement. Under such circumstances, alternative information sources such as 
social media enable investors to access “third-party generated information” related to a firm. 
This suggests that social media has a stronger effect in facilitating the flow of firm-specific 
information to the market for firms with high financial reporting opacity, resulting in stock 
return of such firms being less co-moving with the market and industry returns. In section 2 
we develop a model to formally derive propositions regarding the relation between social 
media coverage, financial reporting opacity and return co-movement. 
                                                        
2 In an analytical study Bleck and Liu (2007) posit that opacity in financial reporting constrains shareholders’ 
ability to distinguish bad projects from good projects at an early stage, leading to the continuation of bad 
projects over time and a higher risk of crash in asset prices. Such a prediction is supported by Hutton et al., 
(2009), which report a positive association between crash risk and the extent firms engage in accrual-based 
earnings management. 
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To empirically test the predictions of our model, we design a computer program to automate 
the process of extracting all articles published on Seeking Alpha website between 2004 and 
2014.3 We focus on single-ticker articles that only provide information about one specific 
firm, and remove from our analysis all multiple-ticker articles that discuss more than one firm 
in one article. Then we focus on firms that have been covered by Seeking Alpha at least once 
in our sample period, and construct the coverage measure as the log of one plus the number 
of single-ticker Seeking Alpha articles for a firm during a specific year.  
Our first measure of co-movement is stock price synchronicity, defined as the extent to which 
variation in firm-level stock return can be explained by market and industry returns (Durnev 
et al., 2003; Piotroski and Roulstone, 2004; Crawford et al., 2012). Following Roll (1988), 
we measure stock price synchronicity with adjusted 2R  from the market model regression to 
capture the extent to which stock price movement can be explained by both market and 
industry-wide information. 4  After a log-transformation, a lower synchronicity measure 
implies that market and industry returns can explain a smaller proportion of individual stock 
returns, suggesting that more firm-specific information has been capitalized into stock price. 
Consistent with our prediction, our results confirm that Seeking Alpha coverage is associated 
with lower synchronicity (lower level of co-movement). Such a result is economically 
significant, because for firms covered by Seeking Alpha, a one-standard deviation increase in 
Seeking Alpha coverage is associated with a 4.3% reduction in the synchronicity measure.5 
Our second measure of co-movement is the percentage point of time-series Pearson 
                                                        
3 Seeking Alpha, which was founded in 2004 by David Jackson, is a social media platform that publishes 
financial commentary and analysis. By the end of 2015 it had 4 million registered users, while more than 10,000 
registered users contribute financial commentary and analysis. Submitted articles are reviewed by a panel and 
are subject to editorial changes, so the quality of published articles is expected to be high. There are 7 million 
average monthly unique visitors and 85 million average monthly page views. Seeking Alpha has a broad 
coverage of stocks, including 4,000 small and mid-cap firms. 
4 This measure of return co-movement (and its variation) has been widely used in previous research (i.e., Morck 
et al., 2000; Fernandes and Ferreira, 2008; Gul et al., 2011). 
5 The reduction is calculated as percentage change in co-movement before log transformation, which is the 
adjusted R2 from regressing firm level stock return on market and industry returns. 
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correlation coefficient between weekly firm return and weekly market return (CORRE). 
Based on this measure we find consistent results that Seeking Alpha coverage is associated 
with lower co-movement. We further corroborate that our findings are robust to estimation 
using a matched sample based on a propensity score (PSM), a two-stage least square (2SLS) 
approach, and decomposing the synchronicity measure into a market return component and 
an industry return component. Results show that Seeking Alpha coverage is negatively 
associated with both the market return component and the industry return component. Taken 
together, our findings suggest that social media plays an important role in facilitating the flow 
of firm-specific information to the market, thus decreasing return co-movement. 
Next, we investigate whether the association between social media coverage and return co-
movement is more pronounced in firms with higher financial reporting opacity, because 
higher financial reporting opacity is expected to make it difficult for investors to obtain 
information from financial reports, thus making them increasingly reliant on alternative 
information source such as social media to access firm-specific information. Consistent with 
Hutton et al., (2009), we use the average discretionary accruals calculated from the Francis et 
al., (2005) model over a three-year period as the first proxy of financial reporting opacity, 
and find evidence supporting the prediction of our model that the effort of social media 
coverage on co-movement is more pronounced in firms with higher financial reporting 
opacity. Our inferences are qualitatively unchanged when we use analyst forecast dispersion 
as the second measure of financial reporting opacity, with the rationale that forecast 
dispersion might be larger for firms with higher opacity. 
The contribution of our study is threefold. Firstly, we extend the literature on the capital 
market consequence of social media (Blankespoor et al., 2014; Lee et al., 2015) by 
developing a model to explicate the relation between social media coverage, financial 
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reporting opacity and co-movement.6 The predictions of the model are supported by data 
collected from Seeking Alpha. As a typical example of social media specializing in financial 
analysis, Seeking Alpha article, which is categorised as “third-party generated information”, 
substantially differs from a firm-initiated press release on Facebook or Twitter. Seeking 
Alpha articles are composed by registered users and independent parties (i.e. the editorial 
team of Seeking Alpha) will verify the quality of submission and the credentials of the author 
(i.e. name, address and contact information) before an article is eventually published. 7 
Furthermore, unlike tweets, which are restricted to 140 characters until September 2017, 
Seeking Alpha articles can accommodate in-depth analysis of a firm, thus conveying valuable 
information with figures and numbers to validate the information. In particular, since January 
2011 Seeking Alpha started paying each contributing author $10 per 1,000 page views on her 
article.8 It is likely, therefore, that the information revealed in a published article on Seeking 
Alpha is of high quality, because the author has a financial incentive to publish articles with 
high credibility. If the information provided in an article proves to be misleading, the 
reputation of the author will be negatively affected, and any future article from the same 
author is unlikely to be published by Seeking Alpha. Similar incentives are absent from both 
Twitter and Facebook, which implies that Seeking Alpha constitutes a power setting to test 
our model.9  
                                                        
6 Blankespoor et al., (2014) find that firms can reduce information asymmetry by disseminating corporate news 
through Twitter, and Lee et al., (2015) show that firms use social media such as Twitter to interact with 
investors to attenuate the negative stock market reaction to product recalls. 
7 According to an article written by Seeking Alpha CEO Ali Hoffmann and posted on its website on 10th April 
2014, the editorial team of Seeking Alpha evaluates each submission based on 1) whether the idea expressed in 
the article is convincing; 2) whether the idea is actionable and 3) whether the idea is well-presented 
(https://seekingalpha.com/article/2134803-how-much-does-seeking-alpha-pay-its-contributors). 
8 According to the same article written by Seeking Alpha CEO Ali Hoffmann and posted on its website on 10th 
April 2014, Seeking Alpha pays authors who contribute articles exclusive to Seeking Alpha. The base payment 
is $10 each 1,000 page views. For high quality analysis of stocks that lack god research (e.g., small –cap), 
Seeking Alpha pays a minimum $150 for articles selected by its editors, and $500 for top small-cap ideas with 
exceptionally attractive risk/reward profiles.  
 
9 To the best of our knowledge, Seeking Alpha data has been used in only one published study. Chen et al. 
(2014) analyse articles published on Seeking Alpha between 2005 and 2012, and find that views expressed in 
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Secondly, our study provides new insights into the determinants of stock return co-movement. 
Since Roll (1988), a considerable amount of research has identified links between co-
movement and investor protection and development of financial market, corporate 
governance, mandatory adoption of XBRL and newspaper coverage (Morck et al., 2000; 
Durnev et al., 2003; Crawford et al., 2012; Dong and Ni, 2014; Dong et al., 2016). Our study 
points to the role of social media in influencing stock return co-movement. 
Finally, our results highlight that social media coverage has incremental effect on the 
incorporation of firm-specific information into stock price for firms with higher financial 
reporting opacity, which suggests that to a certain extent social media can complement 
formal disclosure (e.g., financial statements) in unravelling value-relevant information to the 
market. Our findings have implication for regulators, because regulators could encourage the 
use of social media as an alternative outlet of disclosing value-relevant information, and 
regulators may even coordinate with social media platforms to facilitate the dissemination of 
corporate information and an independent verification and evaluation of such information to 
a broader audience.  
The remainder of the paper is organized as follows. Section 2 develops the model. Sample 
and research design are described in Section 3, and Section 4 presents the empirical results. 
The final section concludes. 
 
2. The model 
 
In the literature, security prices are considered to be jointly determined by a common market 
factor and an idiosyncratic factor (Roll, 1988; Jin and Myers, 2006).10 When a larger fraction 
                                                                                                                                                                            
articles and commentaries predict future stock returns and earnings surprises. Our research question is 
fundamentally different from Chen et al. (2014), in that we are interested in whether Seeking Alpha coverage 
facilitates the disclosure of firm-specific information to the market, thus enhancing overall price co-movement. 
 
10 Roll (1988) suggests that the idiosyncratic factor is largely determined by firm-specific information. 
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of price fluctuation is caused by the idiosyncratic factor, the co-movement between assets 
return and the market factor decreases. In contrast, if the market factor drives the price 
fluctuation to a greater extent, it is reasonable that asset returns will co-integrate with the 
market factor, generating higher return co-movement. Our two-period model, which is 
adapted from the model proposed by Huang et al., (2018), provides insights into how social 
media coverage and financial reporting opacity relate to the attention allocation of investors, 
which consequently influence the return co-movement. In this section, we briefly outline the 
key intuitions and conclusions of our model for conciseness, and refer the readers to 
Appendix 1 for a complete exposition of the model. 
In our two-period model, we assume that the stock price movement is determined by a 
market shock, an industry shock and a firm-specific shock, and we assume one representative 
investor in the economy. The investor has no prior information about each shock at the start 
of the first period, but can learn and refine her beliefs about these shocks, which will be 
revealed at the end of the second period. The investor learn about these shocks by optimally 
assigning her limited amount of attention to each type of shock to obtain signals of the shocks. 
The signal for one type of shock is more precise if the investor assigns more attention to that 
particular type of shock. Consequently, conditioning on knowing the signals about these 
shocks, the investor is less uncertain about their final wealth in the end.  
The investor maximizes her final utility by choosing the optimal demand of each security and 
optimal allocation of attention to each type of shock. Subsequently, the price of each asset at 
the end of the first period is determined based on the optimal demand conditioning on the 
signals. Return co-movements with market or industry returns for the first period are 
determined by the precision of the signal of firm-specific shocks. In detail, the more precise 
the signal of a firm-specific shock, the smaller return co-movements between market and 
industry returns. This results from the fact that the investor possesses more information about 
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the firm-specific shock, so that the firm-specific shock contributes more to the stock price 
relative to the market and industry shocks. 
Our contribution to the original model of Huang et al. (2018) is that we consider explicitly 
the information processing cost in the model. In our model, the information processing cost is 
directly associated with the attention allocated to the firm-specific shock. Intuitively, for the 
same amount of attention allocation, the firm-specific signal is less (more) accurate for the 
firm with a larger (smaller) information processing cost. We then link information processing 
cost to a firm’s social media coverage and financial reporting opacity directly based on our 
hypothesis in the paper, such that firms with lower (higher) social media coverage and higher 
(lower) financial reporting opacity has a higher (lower) information processing cost. Based 
on this assumption, we derive two important propositions: 
 
Proposition 1: Co-movement between firm-specific return and market/industry return is 
smaller for firms with a higher level of social media coverage. 
Proposition 2: The marginal effect of social media coverage on return co-movement is more 
pronounced for firms with higher financial reporting opacity. 
In the remainder of this paper, we test propositions 1 and 2 derived from our theoretical two-
period model empirically using fixed-effect regression models. Details of the design of the 
tests can be found in Section 3.2.  
 
3. Data, variable and research design 
3.1 Data 
Our measure of social media coverage is the number of articles exclusively related to a firm 
for a given year (single-ticker articles) that are posted on the Seeking Alpha, the largest social 
media platform specializing in financial analyses in the US. We design a computer program 
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to automate the process of extracting all single-ticker articles from Seeking Alpha website. 
Specifically, we use a python program based on “Scrapy” to extract all single-ticker articles 
from the website in HTML format. Our data-set includes 133,217 single-ticker articles 
between 2004 and 2014. In the subsequent analysis we use the natural log of one plus the 
number of Seeking Alpha article to alleviate its skewness. Appendix 2 provides an example 
of a typical Seeking Alpha article. We further collect return data from CRSP, firm 
fundamental data from COMPUSTAT, and analyst coverage data from I/B/E/S. We require 
non-missing values for key variables including Seeking Alpha coverage, synchronicity and 
control variables listed in Section 3.2. Our final sample contains 39,568 firm-year 
observations from between 2004 and 2014.11 To mitigate the potential influence of outliers, 
we winsorise all continuous variables at the top and bottom 1%. 
 
3.2 Research design 
3.2.1 Test of Seeking Alpha coverage and stock return co-movement 
Roll (1988) is the first to propose that stock price synchronicity, the association between a 
firm’s stock return and market and industry returns, is negatively associated with the amout 
of firm-specific information being impounded into stock prices. Consistent with this 
approach, we first estimate the adjusted R2 from the following regression for each firm-year: 
titititititi indtmkttindtmkttRET ,1,41,3,2,10, _Re_Re_Re_Re           (1) 
 
where RET is the weekly stock return of individual firm i in week t; Ret_mkt is the weekly 
return calculated as the value-weighted return on all NYSE, AMEX, and NASDAQ stocks in 
week t; Ret_ind is the weekly return of the industry (based on the two-digit SIC code) in 
                                                        
11 The number of observations used to test proposition 1 and 2 varies between 39,568 and 12,606, as the data 
requirements we impose to calculate CORRE and measures of financial reporting opacity result in loss of some 
of the observations. However, when we investigate proposition 1 and 2 with a reduced sample including the 
same number of observations, our inferences remain qualitatively unchanged. 
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week t to which the firm belongs. The lag returns are included to account for non-
synchronous trading. Adjusted R2 is derived from Equation 1. We run Regression (1) across 
each firm-year with a minimum of 45 weekly observations. Following previous literature 
(i.e., Morck et al., 2000; Piotroski and Roulstone, 2004), we define synchronicity as: 
)
.1
.
log(
2
2
RAdj
RAdj
SYNCH

                                                                                                       (2a) 
The benefit of log transformation of 
2.RAdj  is the creation of an unbounded variable out of 
a variable originally bounded between 0 and 1, which generates a dependent variable with 
approximately normal distribution. By construction, higher value of stock price synchronicity 
(SYNCH) indicates that firms’ stock returns are closely tied to market and industry returns 
(higher return co-movement). 
Our second measure of co-movement is the percentage point of time-series Pearson 
correlation coefficient between weekly firm return and weekly market return.  
For time series return of firm i  and market return , CORRE is computed as follows: 
 
                                                                                                                (2b) 
 
To test the association between Seeking Alpha coverage and return co-movement, we 
estimate the following model: 
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       
     
(3) 
 
where Comovement is either stock price synchronicity or CORRE for firm i in year t, and 
 is defined as the natural log of one plus the number of Seeking Alpha single-ticker 
articles covering firm i in year t. We also incorporate a set of control variables that have been 
identified in previous research as affecting stock price synchronicity (Roll, 1988; Hutton et 
al., 2009; Crawford et al., 2012; Kim and Shi, 2012). LNUM is constructed as the natural log 
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of 1 plus the average number of analysts following the firm during the previous fiscal year. 
SIZE is defined as the natural log of the firm’s market capitalisation at the end of the previous 
fiscal year; LMB is measured as the natural log of market capitalisation scaled by the book 
value of equity at the end of the previous fiscal year; LEVERAGE is the total long-term debt 
scaled by the total assets at the end of the previous fiscal year, and ROA is measured as 
income before extraordinary items divided by total assets at the end of the previous fiscal 
year. NIND is the natural log of the number of firms in the industry to which firm i belongs; 
HERFSALE is the sum of the squared terms of the proportion of a firm’s revenue to total 
revenue in the industry at the end of the previous fiscal year; STDROA is the standard 
deviation of ROA in the previous five years. To capture the impact of the quality of external 
auditing, Big4 is set to 1 if the firm is audited by one of the Big 4 audit firms (PwC, Deloitte, 
Ernst & Young or KPMG), 0 otherwise. We adjust the standard error for heteroscedasticity, 
serial and cross-sectional correlation using a two-dimensional cluster at the firm and year 
level (Petersen, 2009). Finally, we include firm fixed effect and year fixed effect to address 
firm-specific and time-series trends of stock price synchronicity. As suggested by Dyreng et 
al., (2010), the utilisation of firm-fixed effect forces the firm to act as its own control, and our 
test essentially concentrates on within-firm variation. The definition of all variables is 
summarized in Appendix 3. 
 
3.2.2 The moderating effect of financial reporting opacity 
To measure financial reporting opacity, we first follow Hutton et al., (2009) to calculate the 
three-year average accruals quality over year t-2 to year t, and label it OPA. Discretionary 
accruals are computed as residual from the estimation error Model (Equation 4). Following 
Francis et al., (2005) model, we calculate the absolute value of the residual from each year 
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for the two-digit SIC industry, and larger discretionary accruals (larger absolute value of 
residual) indicate lower accrual quality: 
, 1 , 1 2 , 3 , 1 4 , 3 ,
0 ,
, 1 , 1 , 1 , 1 , 1 , 1
Rei t i t i t i t i t i t
i t
i t i t i t i t i t i t
TACC CFO CFO CFO v PPE
TA TA TA TA TA TA
    
  
     

                                             (4) 
 
Our second measure of financial reporting opacity is the dispersion of analyst earnings 
forecasts. Previous research (Maffett, 2012) shows that accounting information asymmetry is 
associated with greater analyst forecast dispersion, as the disagreement of earnings forecasts 
among analysts reflects the level of information asymmetry between corporate insiders and 
outsiders (i.e. investors and intermediaries such as analysts). Opaque firms disclose less firm-
specific information or information of inferior quality, which makes it difficult for analysts to 
reach a consensus on earnings forecasts, generating large forecast dispersion. We compute 
the dispersion of analyst earnings forecasts for each firm in year t, and create OPA2 by 
scaling the dispersion with the firm’s opening stock price of the year.  
Then we rely on the following model to test whether Seeking Alpha coverage plays a more 
pronounced role in decreasing return co-movement among firms with higher financial 
reporting opacity: 
, 0 1 , 2 , 3 , , 4 , 5 , 6 , 7 ,
8 , 9 , 10 , 11 , 12 , ,
_ _ *
4
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       
       
        
            
(5) 
where Comovement is either stock price synchronicity or CORRE for firm i in year t. We run 
Regression (5) for the full sample, and expect the coefficient of interaction between Seeking 
Alpha coverage and OPA (OPA2), our main variable of interest, to be significantly negative. 
 
4. Empirical results 
4.1 Descriptive statistics 
Figure 1 presents the summary statistics on the Seeking Alpha coverage. The number of 
Seeking Alpha articles (firms covered by Seeking Alpha) increased from 27 (19) in 2004 to 
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24,939 (3,969) in 2014, showing the substantially growing influence of Seeking Alpha in the 
investment community during our sample period. 
Table 1 provides the descriptive statistics of all the variables. The synchronicity measure has 
a mean (median) of -2.664 (-2.421), and varies from -3.874 (25th percentile) to -1.234 (75th 
percentile). CORRE has a mean (median) of 40.898 (43.003) and varies from 24.361 (25th 
percentile) to 58.662 (75th percentile). The mean (median) of the number of Seeking Alpha 
articles (L_SA) is 0.426 (0.000). The mean (median) of analyst following is 0.952 (0.000), 
and mean (median) of firm size measured by the logarithm of market capitalisation is 6.213 
(6.184), which suggests our sample is populated with large firms. ROA has a mean (median) 
of 0.025 (0.024), and standard deviation of ROA has a mean (median) of 0.101 (0.033). 
Finally, the mean (median) of Big4 is 0.701 (1.000), indicating that more than 70% of our 
sample firms have Big4 as their auditor. All the variables have substantial variation. 
 
<< Insert Table 1 about here >>  
 
4.2 Correlation 
Table 2 presents the Pearson correlation between the variables. Both CORRE and the 
synchronicity measure are positively correlated with Seeking Alpha coverage, which seems 
inconsistent with our prediction.12 However, as we do not control for the other determinants 
of the synchronicity measure, the correlation has to be interpreted with caution. Consistent 
with findings of Piotroski and Roulstone (2004), the two co-movement measures are 
positively correlated with analyst following, suggesting that high analyst coverage facilitates 
the disclosure of market and industry information to the market. The two co-movement 
                                                        
12 The positive correlation likely captures the relation between synchronicity measure and firm size (correlation 
=  0.645, p < 0.001), which in turn is positively associated with Seeking Alpha coverage. 
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measures are positively correlated with size, market-to-book, leverage, ROA, Big4, and is 
negatively related to the standard deviation of ROA and NIND. Finally, the correlation 
statistics do not raise concerns regarding multicollinearity, as the largest correlation is that 
between CORRE and synchronicity (0.847) and they will not enter the same regression. The 
VIF of all subsequent regressions are below 10. 
 
<< Insert Table 2 about here >>  
 
4.3 Multivariate results 
Table 3 reports results related to the prediction that Seeking Alpha coverage is associated 
with lower return co-movement. We use the logarithm of one plus the number of articles on 
Seeking Alpha (L_SA) as the proxy of Seeking Alpha coverage, and synchronicity (column 1 
and 2) and CORRE (column 3 and 4) are used as proxy of co-movement. In column 1(3) we 
regress synchronicity (CORRE) on Seeking Alpha coverage as well as analyst coverage and 
firm size as control variable, because the correlations between these two variables and 
synchronicity measure are the highest among the correlations between all control variables 
and synchronicity measure. In column 2(4) we employ the complete set of control variables 
in the analysis, and also control for both firm-fixed and time-fixed effects. As the results 
across the columns are consistent, we focus on the results in column 2 and 4 for 
interpretation. When synchronicity and CORRE are the dependent variable, the coefficient of 
L_SA is negative and significant (-0.059, t = -4.137; -0.493; t= -2.595 respectively), which 
indicates that more Seeking Alpha coverage enables the incorporation of firm-specific 
information into stock price to a greater extent, leading to lower co-movement. The results 
lend credence to the contention that investment related information disclosed on social media 
can effectively be revealed to the market and capitalised into stock price. Furthermore, we 
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calculate the marginal effect to gauge the economic significance. With all other variables at 
their sample mean, a standard deviation increase of L_SA from its mean results in a 4.3% 
(9.50%) reduction in stock price synchronicity (CORRE). Therefore we conclude that the 
negative association between Seeking Alpha coverage and return co-movement is both 
statistically and economically significant. We further decompose the synchronicity measure 
into a market return component and an industry return component, and in untabulated 
analysis find that Seeking Alpha coverage is negatively associated with both components 
with statistical significance. 
In respect of the control variables, the coefficients of analyst coverage and size are 
significantly positive, whereas the coefficients of market-to-book are negative and 
significant. These findings are broadly consistent with those documented in previous research 
(Piotroski and Roulstone, 2004; Crawford et al., 2012). 
 
<< Insert Table 3 about here >> 
 
Table 4 shows results related to the prediction that the influence of Seeking Alpha coverage 
on return co-movement is more pronounced in firms with high financial reporting opacity. 
We use 1) the three-year average of discretionary accruals calculated from the Francis et al., 
(2005) model (OPA) 2) analyst forecast dispersion (OPA2) as proxies for financial reporting 
opacity, so firms with large average discretionary accruals (larger forecast dispersion) are 
considered to be more opaque. We introduce an interaction term between OPA (OPA2) and 
Seeking Alpha coverage measures (L_SA), and the coefficient of the interaction term is the 
main variable of interest.  
We present 4 models, where OPA (OPA2) is the proxy of opacity in module 1 and 2 (3 and 
4). In column 1 and 2 where synchronicity and CORRE are the dependent variable, the 
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coefficient of the interaction between L_SA and OPA is negative and significant (-0.143, t = 
-4.294; -1.939, t= -3.637 respectively), In column 3 and 4 where synchronicity and CORRE 
are the dependent variable, the coefficient of interaction between L_SA and OPA2 is 
significantly negative (-0.071, t = -4.561; -0.435, t= -2.453 respectively).  The findings 
suggest that relative to firms with lower opacity (smaller discretionary accruals and smaller 
forecast dispersion), Seeking Alpha coverage plays a more significant role in reducing return 
co-movement for firms with high opacity (larger discretionary accruals and larger forecast 
dispersion). It is likely that investors (in particular individual investors) find it difficult and 
costly to acquire information for firms with high opacity, and Seeking Alpha articles 
effectively enable the flow of firm-specific information on such firms to the market, leading 
to an incremental decrease in return co-movement.13  
 
<< Insert Table 4 about here >> 
 
4.4 Endogeneity issue 
4.4.1 Propensity score matching (PSM) 
Our results may suffer from endogeneity, because firms are less likely to be randomly 
covered by social media such as Seeking Alpha. For example, large firms, firms with extreme 
unexpected earnings or firms in selected industries (i.e. consumer-oriented industries) are 
more likely to be covered on Seeking Alpha. Our first approach to address the concern of 
endogeneity is the propensity score matching (PSM) method. We estimate the following logit 
model for each year: the dependent variable is coded 1 if a firm is covered by Seeking Alpha 
                                                        
13  We divide our sample into low opacity and high opacity sub-samples based on a sample mean of 
discretionary accruals and analyst forecast dispersion, and run the baseline model in two sub-samples. 
Untabulated results show that both the magnitude and significance levels of the Seeking Alpha coverage 
measure are higher in the high-opacity sub-sample, suggesting that Seeking Alpha coverage plays a more 
significant role in reducing return co-movement among firms with high opacity. This is consistent with the 
findings based on regression analysis incorporating interaction between the measure of opacity and Seeking 
Alpha coverage. 
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in a given year and zero otherwise; the independent variables include all firm-level control 
variables in Equation 3. Secondly, without replacement we match each “treatment firm” (a 
firm covered by Seeking Alpha in a given year t) with two matching firms (firms that are not 
covered by Seeking Alpha in the same year) that have the closet propensity scores within a 
maximum distance of 1%. That is, we use a nearest-neighbour matching approach with 
common support and a caliper constraint of 0.01. We have 21,528 observations for this 
analysis. The matching appears successful as the standardized biases of variables are less 
than 5% after the matching. We include year fixed effect in the first stage prediction model, 
which effectively removes the time-trend of increasing Seeking Alpha coverage over the 
sample period. 
We repeat the analysis using the PSM sample, and the results are reported in Table 5. It is 
clear that the tenor of our results remains qualitatively unchanged, because the coefficient of 
Seeking Alpha coverage is significantly negative (-0.055, t = -3.138; -1.133, t= -5.111) in 
regressions when synchronicity and CORRE are used as measure of co-movement. 
 
<< Insert Table 5 about here >> 
 
4.4.2 Two-stage least square (2SLS) 
We employ two instrumental variables (IVs) for Seeking Alpha coverage to further mitigate 
the issue of endogeneity. The first instrument is the annual advertising expenditure of a firm. 
We construct the instrumental variable L_ADX using the natural log of 1 plus the firm’s 
annual advertising expenditure. The second instrument is the intensity of Seeking Alpha 
coverage for the industry to which a firm belongs. The second instrumental variable, denoted 
by L_SA_IND is measured as the natural log of 1 plus the total annual number of Seeking 
Alpha articles for the industry to which the firm belongs. We expect Seeking Alpha coverage 
18 
 
to be positively correlated with both IVs, because firms with higher advertising expenditure 
are more likely to attract the attention of both investors in general and registered users of 
Seeking Alpha in particular. Firms belonging to industries that attract more attention from 
Seeking Alpha are more likely to be covered. On the other hand, firm-level advertising 
expenditure and industry-level Seeking Alpha coverage are less likely to have a direct 
influence on return co-movement at firm level. Both IVs pass the over-identification test, and 
the results are consistent with our prediction. In the first stage, we find that both IVs are 
significantly and positively associated with Seeking Alpha coverage at firm level. In the 
second stage, the negative and significant effect of predicted Seeking Alpha coverage on co-
movement remains, thus corroborating our findings reported in Section 4.3. 
 
<< Insert Table 6 about here >> 
 
4.4.3 Loss of social media coverage 
We further address the endogeneity issue by concentrating on the loss of Seeking Alpha 
coverage. Seeking Alpha authors who persistently publish articles and whose articles receive 
more commentaries would attract more attention from the audience. Therefore, in each 
quarter we rank all contributing authors based on their number of articles, number of firms 
covered, total comments received and average comments received per article. The quarterly 
synchronicity measure is calculated based on the adjustedR2 from regressions of daily stock 
returns against the market return and the industry returns for each firm-quarter observation: 
titititi indtmkttRET ,,2,10, _Re_Re                                                              (6) 
We also calculate CORRE as the time-series Pearson correlation coefficient between daily 
firm returns and the market returns for each quarter. 
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Loss of Seeking Alpha coverage is defined when an author who meets the following criteria 
stops publishing articles on Seeking Alpha: 1) the author must have been publishing for at 
least four quarters continuously; 2) during the continuous coverage period the author’s rank 
in terms of quarterly number of articles published, number of firms covered, total comments 
received and average comments received per article stay in the top 50% of all contributing 
authors.14 We expect that the loss of coverage by such an influential author results in less 
firm-specific information flow to the market, leading to stock price being more synchronous 
to the market (higher return co-movement). For each case of loss of coverage, we calculate 
the quarterly average coverage of the firm that the author published during her continuous-
publishing period. L_SA_DROP is defined as the natural log of 1 plus the average number of 
Seeking Alpha articles for a firm contributed by the author before she ceases publishing 
articles in the following quarter. Using the specified criteria, we find 366 exogenous drop 
events of active authors, which leads to 6,379 exogenous drops of firm-quarter observations. 
We run Model 7 to examine the potential effect of loss of coverage by active SA authors. The 
higher the value of L_SA_DROP, the more severe in increase in return co-movement after 
the loss of coverage, as evidenced by a significant and positive
2 .  
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_ _ _
4
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      
   
          (7) 
The results, which are presented in Table 7, Column 2 (where the dependent variable is 
synchronicity) and column 4 (where the dependent variable is CORRE), are consistent with 
our prediction (
2 = 0.162, t = 2.033; 2 = 1.875, t = 1.871 respectively). The findings show 
that loss of coverage indeed results in higher co-movement for the previously covered firm, 
                                                        
14 The median of our active author sample has an average quarterly coverage of three firms. An active author 
may discontinue publishing articles related to a specific firm due to the dynamic of company-specific 
information. However, loss of entire coverage by an active author is probably due to personal reasons.  
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which implies a casual relationship between Seeking Alpha coverage and return co-
movement.  
 
<< Insert Table 7 about here >> 
 
4.4.4 “Day of the Week” effect 
We test the “day of the week effect” based on the conjecture that articles published on 
weekdays (Monday-Thursday) are more influential, as investors can trade in response to the 
news released in an article without delay. In contrast, investors have to wait for the trading 
day in the following week before they can react to information released in articles published 
during weekends. Therefore, our prediction is that articles published on weekend (Friday, 
Saturday and Sunday) have a relatively smaller information effect. We test such a conjecture 
with Model 8, with the expectation that 
1 (the coefficient of weekend coverage) is 
significantly smaller than 
2 (the coefficient of weekday coverage).   
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5 , 6 , 7 , 8 , 9 , 10 , 11 ,
,
_ _ _ _
4
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Comovement L SA WEEKENDS L SA WEEKDAY LNUM SIZE
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    
      
  
    
      
   
   (8) 
L_SA_WEEKENDS is the natural log of 1 plus the number of single-ticker Seeking Alpha 
articles posted on Friday, Saturday and Sunday for a firm in the quarter. L_SA_WEEKDAY 
is the natural log of 1 plus the number of single-ticker Seeking Alpha articles posted from 
Monday to Thursday for a firm in the quarter. The results, which are presented in Table 8, are 
consistent with our prediction (
1 = -0.079, t = -3.529; 2 = -0.167, t = -9.963 when 
synchronicity is the dependent variable; 
1 = -1.204, t = -5.397; 2 = -2.048, t = -12.239 
when CORRE is the dependent variable. F-test confirms that in both regressions 
1 is 
significantly smaller than  
2 ). 
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<< Insert Table 8 about here >> 
 
4.5 Robustness check 
In this section we test whether Seeking Alpha coverage facilitates the incorporation of a type 
of firm-specific information, future earnings, into current stock price. We use the model 
outlined in Kothari and Sloan (1992):  
titiktti ERET ,,10,, *                                                                                                    (9) 
where kttiRET ,, is the stock return from period t ̶̵‒k to period t. tiE , is the earnings in period t 
(future earnings), defined as income before extraordinary items divided by total assets. As 
predicted by Kothari and Sloan (1992), when the time interval k increases, firm-level 
information becomes more likely to be incorporated into the return over the period t–k to t. 
Hence, r1 should increase with k. In the case where investors retrieve firm-level information 
earlier, the estimated r1 will be larger when the estimated interval is longer. We estimate the 
following system of equations using the Seemingly Unrelated Regression (SUR) technique, 
as SUR provides more efficient estimation than separate OLS regressions when the 
disturbances of the equations are related. 
  RETi,t,t-1 = r0 +r1EARNINGi,t +r2EARNINGi,t *L_SAi,t-1 +Controls+ei,t      9(a) 
  RETi,t,t-2 =q0 +q1EARNINGi,t +q2EARNINGi,t *L_SAi,t-2 +Controls+ei,t       9(b) 
The ratio of 2 in Equation 9(b) to 2 in Equation 9(a) measures the relative speed with which 
stock price incorporates future earnings for firms with higher Seeking Alpha coverage. The 
larger the ratio, the earlier investors incorporate a firm’s future earnings into current stock 
price for firms with higher Seeking Alpha coverage. Evidence supporting such prediction is 
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consistent with the notion that higher Seeking Alpha coverage is associated with more 
forward-looking information being capitalised into current stock price. 
Table 9 presents results supporting the view that Seeking Alpha coverage facilitates the 
incorporation of future earnings into current stock price. In particular, 
2 in the two-year 
period estimation (0.056, t = 6.972) is significantly larger than 
2  in the one-year estimation 
(0.012, t = 3.342). The difference of coefficients results in a Wald-statistics of 23.07 (p < 
0.01). To conclude, we find evidence that stock prices of firms with higher Seeking Alpha 
coverage incorporate future earnings more efficiently. 
<< Insert Table 9 about here >> 
 
Our final robustness check utilizes an exogenous shock launched by Seeking Alpha in 2011. 
From January 2011, Seeking Alpha started paying each contributing authors $10 per 1,000 
page views on their articles, with an attempt to attract submission with high quality of 
information. Therefore, we expect that in the post-2011 period Seeking Alpha articles 
provided more information to the market relative to that in the pre-2011 period. 
Consequently, the impact of Seeking Alpha coverage on co-movement is likely to be more 
significant in the post-2011 period.15 To test this prediction, we introduced an interaction 
term between L_SA and a dummy variable POST (which takes 1 for observations after 2011 
and 0 otherwise). We maintain the same set of control variables as in early analysis.16 The 
results, which are presented in Table 10, lend support to our conjecture. The coefficient of 
interaction is negative and significant when synchronicity and CORRE are the dependent 
variable (-0.140, t= -3.720; -3.652, t= -3.056), suggesting that Seeking Alpha coverage plays 
                                                        
15 The event year 2011 is not considered as a post-2011 year to avoid potential confounding effect. Therefore, 
the post-2011 period includes 2012, 2013 and 2014. 
16 Because POST is a time dummy, we do not include time fixed effect in the analysis. Instead we cluster the 
standard error by firm and year to account for autocorrelation.  
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a stronger role in reducing co-movement after financial incentive has been provided to 
enhance the information quality of published articles in 2011.  
 
<< Insert Table 10 about here >> 
 
We conducted additional robustness checks. For brevity we do not tabulate these results. As 
Seeking Alpha articles that receive more commentaries would attract more attention from the 
audience, we classified articles into influential ones and less influential ones based on the 
median value of commentaries on the original article for a given year, and expected 
influential articles to play a more significant role in reducing return co-movement. The 
untabulated results confirm our prediction that influential Seeking Alpha articles have more 
effect on reducing return co-movement than less influential articles. 
 
5. Conclusion 
Mindful of the increasing importance of social media as a venue for information production 
and dissemination in the new millennium, in this paper we develop a model to predict that the 
coverage of a public firm on social media substantially reduces the information acquisition 
and processing cost for investors. Consequently, this facilitates the transmission of more 
firm-specific information into stock price, resulting in lower return co-movement. We test the 
prediction of our model with data collected from the Seeking Alpha website between 2004 
and 2014, and find that Seeking Alpha coverage is negatively associated with return co-
movement. In addition, we show that the effect of Seeking Alpha coverage on return co-
movement is more salient in firms with higher financial reporting opacity. Our findings are 
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robust to propensity score matching, a two-stage least square (2SLS) approach, and 
alternative measures of firm opacity. 
Our study is of interest to investors because sophisticated financial market participants might 
be incentivized to develop trading techniques that take into account the coverage on social 
media when formulating their trading strategy. Our findings have important implication for 
regulators, as social media is landscape shifting in that it has become a revolutionary 
approach to information generation, evaluation and dissemination in the 21st century due to 
its global access and interactive nature. 
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Appendix 1: The two-period model 
Our two-period model closely follows the model proposed by Huang et al., (2018) based on 
the theoretical framework of Kacperczyk et al., (2016). We provide insights on how social 
media coverage and financial reporting opacity relate to the attention allocation of attention 
of investors, which further influence the co-movement between firm specific returns and the 
industry and market returns. 
1.1 General setting and asset payoffs 
In the model we consider an economy of two periods: 0,1,2t  . At time 0, investors have no 
prior beliefs about the payoffs of the securities. At time 1, investors update their beliefs by 
allocating their attentions to different securities, and rebalance their portfolio. The payoffs of 
the assets are realized at time 2. 
We assume there are n>2 industries and 2k   securities within each industry. Each stock has 
a net positive supply normalized as 1. There exists a risk-free asset with the payoff of 1 for 
each unit. The payoff of the j -th stock in the i -th industry is denoted as ,i jV , which is 
realized at 2t  . The following relationship is assumed for the payoff of the j -th stock in 
the i -th industry for all 1:j k  and 1:i n : 
 
, , , ,i j i j i i jV V m e f     
in which 
,i jV  is the mean payoff of the security, m  is the market-wide shock to the payoff, ie  
is an industry-wide shock to the payoff, and ,i jf  is a firm-specific shock to the payoff. 
Investors have no information about these shocks at time 0. We assume the following 
dynamics of the shocks: 
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Following Huang et al., (2018) and to simplify the analysis, we assume that 
0m e f       , so that the variance of three shocks are identical. 
1.2 Investors and learning 
There is one representative investor in the economy, and we assume that the investor has a 
mean-variance utility function over his wealth at 2t  . For each 0,1,2t  , we denote his 
wealth at time t  as tW . We use tF  to denote the information set available to the investor at 
time t . Clearly we have 0 1 2 F F F , where 0F  is the trivial information set at time 0. At 
time 1, investor updates their information set to 1F  by refining their beliefs about the shocks 
m , ie  and ,i jf . The information set 2F  contains all the information about the payoffs, and is 
not available to the investor. The investor's objective is to optimize the following utility 
function based on the available information set: 
 
2 1 2 1E( | ) V( | ),
2
W W

F F  
where   is understood as the risk aversion coefficient. 
At time 1, the investor can learn about the shocks m , ie  and ,i jf  by allocating her attention, 
which is constrained by some positive constant K , known as the learning capacity. We 
propose to specify the learning process of the investor as follows: 
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in which ms , ,e is  and , ,f i js  are the signals the investor receive at time 1 about the market 
shock m , the industry shock ie  and the firm-specific shock ,i jf . For the market and industry 
signals, they are obtained with errors m  and ,e i  respectively. The investor needs to allocate 
her attention m  and ,e i  to each error term to refine the signal. Intuitively, larger m  results 
in a more precise signal for the market component, and as 0m  , ms  is not informative 
about m  at all. 
Deviating from Huang et al., (2018), we propose to introduce additional quantities ,i j , and 
,i jO  for each stock to refine investor's learning process about the firm-specific shock ,i jf . 
The quantity , 0i j   stands for the social media coverage for the stock at time 1, such that 
larger ,i j  represents a higher social media coverage, and vice versa. The quantity 
, 0i jO   is defined as a measure of the transparency of the stock's financial reports, that is, the 
larger ,i jO  is, the less opaque the firm's financial reports. In our model we assume that ,i j  
and ,i jO  are independent across firms. 
In the specification above, for the same amount of attention input , ,f i j ,  larger ,i j  and ,i jO  
reduce the information processing cost according to our hypothesis, and vice versa. By 
multiplying the attention allocation , ,f i j  by , , ,i j i j i jE O  , we model the information 
processing cost of learning the firm specific shock explicitly such that any increase in ,i j  or 
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,i jO  decreases the information cost and improves the precision of firm-specific signal 
, ,f i js  for a given attention allocation , ,f i j . The quantity ,i jE  can be interpreted as an 
inverse measure of information processing cost, and clearly when , 1i jE   for all i  and j , 
our model reduces to the model in Huang et al., (2018).  
At time 1, the investor will decide how to allocate her attentions subject to her total learning 
capacity K : 
 , , ,
1 1 1
.
n n k
m e i f i j
i i j
K  
  
     
We also require that m , ,e i  and , ,f i j  are larger or equal to zero, so the investor cannot 
allocate negative attention. 
1.3 Price, demand and optimal attention allocation at equilibrium 
We denote the nk -by-1 vector of asset prices at time t  by tP , which is of the following 
structure: 
. , , 1: , 1:{ } ,t i j t i n j kP  P  
where , ,i j tP  is the price of the j -th stock in the i -th industry at time t . It is obvious that 
2 P V , where V  is the vector of payoff from all stocks at time 2.  Similarly we define the 
nk -by-1 vector of asset prices at time t  as: 
 , , 1: , 1:{ } ,t i j t i n j kX  X  
where , ,i j tX  is the demand of the j -th stock in the i -th industry at time t . The wealth of the 
investor can therefore be expressed as: 
 2 0 0 1 0 0 1( ) ( ).
T TW W    X P P X V P  
The investor maximizes her utility at time 2 through the following two-step procedure. At 
0t  , the investor does not have any meaningful information about the shocks, and will 
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maximize her utility function conditional on the trivial information set 0F , which is omitted 
for brevity: 
0
2 2
2 0 0 1 0 1 1
max [ ] V[ ],
2
. . ( ) ( ).
E
T T
W W
s t W W


    
X
X P P X V P  
At time 1, the investor obtain new information set 1F , and need to maximize her utility based 
on the new information set through the following two-step optimization problem: 
                                           
, , 1, , ,
2 1 2 1
2 1 1 1
, , ,
1 1 1
, , ,
max {max [ | ] V[ | ]},
2
. . ( ),
0, 0, 0, , ,
E E
m e i f i j
T
n n k
m e i f i j
i i j
m e i f i j
W W
s t W W
K
i j
  

  
  
  

  
  
   
 
X
X V P
F F
                           (10) 
where 1F  contains the information in ms , ,e is  and , ,f i js  for all i  and j . The investor firstly 
chooses ,,m e i   and , ,f i j  to allocate her attention optimally, and maximizes the expected 
utility by choosing the optimal quantity 1X  conditioning on 1F . 
The optimization problem above can be solved using backward induction. At time 1 given the 
attention allocation  s, the optimal demand 1X  is available in closed form since the 
objective function is just a quadratic function of 1X : 
1
1 1 1 1
1
V[ | ] (E[ | ] ).

 X V V PF F
 
In the equilibrium, the market clearing condition is 1 11nkX , where 1nk  is a nk -by-1 vector 
of 1s. Substituting this into the equation above yields: 
                                             1 1 1 1
E[ | ] V[ | ]1nk  P V VF F                               (11) 
Substituting 1 11nkX  and the above Equation into Equation (10), the optimization problem 
reduces to: 
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, ,, , ,
1
, , ,
1 1 1
, , ,
max V[ | ],
2
. . ,
0, 0, 0, , , .
m e i f i j
n n k
m e i f i j
i i j
m e i f i j
s t K
i j n
  

  
  
  

  
   
 
V F
                               (12) 
Note that 1V[ | ] V[ | ] 1/ ( )f mm m s    F , which is simply the variance of the posterior 
distribution of m  taking the unconditional distribution of m  as a prior. Similarly, 
1 ,V[ | ] 1/ ( )i e ie   F  and , 1 , , , )V[ | ] 1/ (i j f i j i jf E  F . The optimization problem in 
Equation (12) is equivalent to the following: 
 
, ,, , ,
2 2 2
1 1 1, , , ,
, , ,
1 1 1
, , ,
1
min
. .
0, 0, 0, , ,
m e i f i j
n n k
i i jm e i f i j i j
n n k
m e i f i j
i i j
m e i f i j
n k k
E
s t K
i j
        
  
  
  
  
 
  
  
   
 
   
This optimization problem can be solved via the Lagrangian multiplier: 
 
2 2 2
1 1 1, , , ,
, , ,
1 1 1
, , , , , ,
1 1 1
1
( )
n n k
i i jm e i f i j i j
n n k
K m e i f i j
i i j
n n k
m m e i e i f i j f i j
i i j
n k k
L
E
K
     
   
     
  
  
  
  
  
   
  
 
 
 
 
The above function is a strictly decreasing and convex function of  s, therefore it must have 
one unique solution. The solution can be easily derived by setting the first order conditions of 
the above Langrangian multiplier to zero and solve for the system of inequalities. After some 
calculation, we obtain: 
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,
1
,
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,
2
0,
m
K
e i
K
f i j
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K
m e i f i j
nk
k
EE
K n C
nk C
 

 






  
 
 
 
  


  
 
in which 1 ,
1 1
1/
n k
i j
i j
C E
 
  and  2 ,
1 1
1/
n k
i j
i j
C E
 
  are constants that can be interpreted as 
overall measures of information processing cost for all stocks.  Since we are not interested in 
the scenario when there is a scarcity of the attention resources, we assume that K  is 
sufficiently large, so that we always have 0m e   , which is a result documented in 
Huang et al., (2018).  
1.4 Social media coverage, financial reporting opacity and return co-movement 
We proceed to demonstrate the relationship between social media coverage, financial 
reporting opacity and return co-movements. We firstly define the firm specific, industry and 
market returns from time 0 to time 1 as follows: 
 
, , ,1 , ,0
,
,
1 1
1
,
1
.
,i j i j i j
n
i i j
j k
n k
m i j
i j
r P P
r r
k
r r
nk

 
 




 
So the industry returns and market returns are just equally weighted returns for the stocks. 
Also, our results do not differ qualitatively when using other weighting schemes with fixed 
weights. 
The price of each stock at time 1 is given by Equation (11). Note that the conditional variance 
part 1V[ | ]V F  is non-random. We can therefore write the return ,i jr  as: 
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, ,
, , , ,
, ,
,
i j e im e
i j m e i f i j
m e i j e i
E
r C s s s
E
 
     
   
  
  
where 0
1 1 , , ,
1
( )
n k
i jm e i j f i j
nk nk
C P
E

      
    
  
  is a constant. Our primary measures 
of the co-movement between market return, industry return and firm-specific return are the 
2R  obtained from regressing firm-specific return on market and industry returns 
correspondingly. This can be interpreted as the variation in ,i jr  that can be explained by mr  
and ir  respectively. We can decompose the variance of ,i jr  into three components: variance 
due to market shock mVar , industry shock iVar  and firm-specific shock ,i jVar . These three 
components are formally defined as follows: 
 
,
, ,
, , ,
, , ,
V 1 ,
V 1 ,
V 1 .
[ ]
[ ]
[ ]
Km
m m
m
Ke
i e i
e
i j e i K
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E
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E E
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 
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 
  
 
  

  

  

 
Notice that we are only interested in the stocks with 
,
1K
i jE


 , since when this does not hold, 
, , 0f i j   and the co-movement is irrelevant of the information processing cost. The market 
and industry 2R  measures are then formally defined as follows: 
 
2
, ,
,
2
, ,
,
,
.
m
i j m
m i i j
m i
i j i
m i i j
Var
R
Var Var Var
Var Var
R
Var Var Var

 


 
 
Differentiating w.r.t. ,i jE  yields: 
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                              (13) 
We deduce Proposition 3 and 4 from the above relationships, which leads directly to 
Propositions 1 and 2 stated in Section 2 respectively: 
Proposition 3: The co-movement measures 2
, ,i j mR  and 
2
, ,i j iR  decrease monotonically as ,i j  
increases, holding ,i jO  constant. 
Proof. Since , , ,i j i j i jE O  , it is obvious from (13) that the derivatives of both co-movement 
measures w.r.t. social media coverage are strictly negative.        ∎ 
Proposition 4: The marginal effects of an increase in social media coverage on the co-
movement measures 2
, ,i j mR  and 
2
, ,i j iR  are larger for firms with smaller ,i jO , or higher financial 
reporting opacity. 
Proof. We only need to show that the denominators in 
2
, ,
,
i j m
i j
R
E


 and 
2
, ,
,
i j i
i j
R
E


 increases as a 
function of ,i jO , which evidently holds.           ∎ 
It is evident that Propositions 3 and 4 lead to Propositions 1 and 2 directly. Moreover, we can 
test for these propositions empirically by using fixed-effect panel regressions, since the 
coefficients of the explanatory variables and interaction terms can be interpreted naturally as 
marginal effects. 
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Appendix 2: Seeking Alpha article example 
Amazon Earnings Broadly As Expected 
 
Apr. 25, 2013 5:39 PM ET 
135 comments  About: Amazon.com, Inc. (AMZN) 
Paulo Santos 
(10,045 followers) 
Long/short equity, arbitrage, event-driven 
 
Amazon (NASDAQ:AMZN) reported its Q1 2013 earnings. These came in at $0.18 versus a $0.09 
consensus. At first the stock climbed quite a bit on the notion that it had beat or doubled expectations, 
but one needs to consider that for Amazon, $0.10 in excess or missing on its earnings is basically 
irrelevant, because it needs just $46 million or a puny 0.28% of sales for a beat or miss of that 
magnitude. 
Also predictable, Amazon's revenues came in slightly below consensus ($16.07 billion vs $16.16 
billion consensus). More relevant was Amazon's guidance for Q2 2013, which was as follows: 
Net sales are expected to be between $14.5 billion and $16.2 billion, or to grow between 13% and 
26% compared with second quarter 2012. 
Operating income (loss) is expected to be between $(340) million and $10 million, compared to $107 
million in the comparable prior year period. 
This guidance includes approximately $340 million for stock-based compensation and amortization of 
intangible assets, and it assumes, among other things, that no additional business acquisitions, 
investments, or legal settlements are concluded and that there are no further revisions to stock-based 
compensation estimates. 
As I predicted before the earnings were released, this constitutes another guide-down for Amazon's 
revenues. The midpoint of the guidance falls at $15.35 billion whereas present consensus sits at 
$15.94. I'd expect consensus to be revised lower to around $15.7-$15.8 billion or so. 
Comparison to my model 1 
The model 1 predictions compared as follows to what Amazon actually reported: 
11 
 
 
In what regards my own modelling, where I use my model 1 for both short term and long term 
predictions, the major differences were in 3 cost lines and 1 margin line: 
 Product margins came in at 11.3% versus my 11.0% assumption. My 2013 assumption is 
11.1%, which I will revise towards 11.2%; 
 Technology, which came in 5.5% below my estimate. This implied a ratio of 
Technology/Other revenue of 173.3% versus my Q1 2013 assumption of 183% … but it should be 
12 
 
noted that my 2013 assumption is 175% so lower than Q1 2013. I will revise my long term 
assumptions down 2% per year as a result; 
 G&A, which came in 7.2% below my estimate. This implied a ratio of G&A/GMV of 0.78% 
versus my assumption of 0.85%. Since my 2013 assumption is already 0.80% this will mean no 
change as this number is somewhat volatile and the yearly assumption is already below Q1 and 
near the realised value; 
 Fulfillment, which came in 4.7% above my estimate. This implied a ratio of 
Fulfillment/GMV of 5.71% versus my assumption of 5.50%. Q1 is usually the lowest in this 
regard so this implies a higher 2013 assumption. Presently the assumption is at 5.64%, so I will 
change the model towards 5.7%. 
My own long-term model already implies that technology will get better (less costly) over the long-
term, so no surprise there. G&A has some volatility so it won't imply much of a change. As for 
fulfilment, it might have negative implications for the long term. 
All in all the cost relationships held quite well. The minor $40 million difference in net profit is well 
within the kind of uncertainty one can expect while predicting a company of Amazon's size and 
basically came from the product margins being slightly ahead of expectations, probably still from the 
higher margins enjoyed by the new Kindle Fires. 
It should also be noted that every revenue growth assumption was very close to what Amazon 
reported, from 1P to 3P to other revenue. 
Revised long-term model 
Taking into account the slight differences explained, my revised long-term model now predicts the 
following: 
-++  
The predictions are unchanged for the most part, with the margins and cost lines basically 
compensating each other, only the lower tax rate ends up having a slight positive effect for 2013. 
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Conclusion 
Amazon's earnings report brought nothing new. The growth rates and costs continue mostly as 
expected - the cost relationships held, with most uncertainty remaining on technology, where 
improvement is already expected and always difficult to model. 
These cost relationships mean that Amazon will have a lot of trouble ever meeting the lofty 
expectations the Street has for it. At the same time Amazon's growth rates continue to falter and 
perhaps somewhat amazingly, net shipping costs increased again. 
There was nothing in the report to change my opinion that Amazon is a clear short which will never 
produce enough profit to justify the levels it trades at. I expect this report to lead to another round of 
downward estimate revisions in terms of revenues, and perhaps also in terms of EPS. These revisions 
are systematic because the long-term models the Street uses do not respect the stable cost 
relationships that I have identified, 
Disclosure: I am short AMZN. I wrote this article myself, and it expresses my own opinions. I am not 
receiving compensation for it (other than from Seeking Alpha). I have no business relationship with 
any company whose stock is mentioned in this article. 
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Appendix 3: Variable definitions 
 
Variable 
 
Definition 
SYNCH Stock return synchronicity after log transformation 
CORRE 
Percentage points of time-series Pearson correlation coefficient between weekly firm return and 
weekly market returns 
L_SA Natural log of (SA article number + 1) 
LNUM Natural log of (number of analyst coverage + 1) 
SIZE Natural log of (Firm’s market capitalisation) 
LMB Natural log of (market capitalisation scaled by the book value of equity) 
LEVERAGE Total long term debt scaled by total assets 
ROA Income before extraordinary items scaled by total assets 
NIND Natural log of the number of firms in the industry to which firm I belongs 
HERFSALE Sum of squared terms of the proportion of a firm’s revenue to total revenue in the industry 
STDROA 
Standard deviation of the ratio between income before extraordinary items and total asset in the 
previous five years 
BIG4 Dummy variable, set to 1 if the firm is audited by one of the Big 4 audit firms 
OPA 
Measure of financial opacity, which is the average of accrual quality value of the previous three 
years. Accrual quality measure is based on the Francis et al., (2005) model. Measured as 
absolute value of residual from each year two-digit SIC industry cross sectional regression: 
 
 
OPA2 Analyst earnings forecast dispersion scaled by firm’s opening stock price of the year 
EARNING Earnings before extraordinary items scaled by total assets 
L_SA_IND Natural log of (the total annual SA coverage of the industry to which the firm belongs + 1) 
L_ADX Natural log of (firm’s annual advertising expenditure + 1) 
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Figure 1: Summary statistics of Seeking Alpha articles  
 
 
Year Seeking Alpha article Firms covered by Seeking 
Alpha 
2004 27 19 
2005 1165 426 
2006 5753 1707 
2007 13710 2809 
2008 13111 2721 
2009 15842 2645 
2010 13996 2808 
2011 13719 2813 
2012 14188 2818 
2013 16767 3089 
2014 24939 3969 
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Table 1: Descriptive statistics 
 
Variable Mean 
Std. 
Dev. Min P25 Median P75 Max N 
SYNCH -2.664 1.962 -16.689 -3.874 -2.421 -1.234 5.508 39568 
CORRE 40.898 23.194 -45.684 24.361 43.003 58.662 94.502 39568 
L_SA 0.426 0.788 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.693 6.632 39568 
LNUM 0.952 1.108 0.000 0.000 0.000 1.923 4.022 39568 
SIZE 6.213 2.119 -1.038 4.661 6.184 7.670 13.348 39568 
LMB 0.702 0.883 -3.332 0.176 0.634 1.150 9.241 39568 
LEVERAGE 0.154 0.173 0.000 0.001 0.097 0.255 0.969 39568 
ROA 0.025 2.308 -10.655 -0.008 0.024 0.067 226.310 39568 
NIND 5.157 1.195 0.000 4.263 5.389 6.194 6.796 39568 
HERFSALE 0.075 0.080 0.010 0.035 0.045 0.090 1.000 39568 
STDROA 0.101 0.960 0.000 0.013 0.033 0.087 92.564 39568 
BIG4 0.701 0.458 0.000 0.000 1.000 1.000 1.000 39568 
OPA 0.071 0.156 0.000 0.024 0.042 0.080 8.641 22847 
 
 
Table 1 presents the descriptive statistics of variables used in the analysis. The sample contains 39,568 firm-year 
observations over the period 2004–2014. P25 (P75) is the 25th (75th) percentile of the variable’s distribution. 
SYNCH, stock price synchronicity, is defined as the log-transformation of the adjusted R2 of the firm-year 
estimation regressing weekly stock return on weekly market- and industry-level returns; CORRE is the 
percentage points of time-series Pearson correlation coefficient between weekly firm returns and the weekly 
market returns; L_SA is the natural log of 1 plus the number of single-ticker Seeking Alpha articles for a firm in 
the year; LNUM is the natural log of 1 plus the number of analysts following the firm for the previous fiscal 
year; SIZE is the natural log of the firm’s market capitalisation at the end of the last fiscal year; LMB is the 
natural log of market capitalisation scaled by the book value of equity at the end of the last fiscal year; 
LEVERAGE is the total long-term debt scaled by total assets at the end of the last fiscal year; ROA is income 
before extraordinary items divided by total assets at the end of the last fiscal year; NIND is the natural log of the 
number of firms in the industry to which firm i belongs at the end of the last fiscal year; HERFSALE is the sum 
of the squared terms of the proportion of a firm’s revenue to total revenue in the industry at the end of the last 
fiscal year; STDROA is the standard deviation of the ratio between income before extraordinary items and total 
assets in the previous five years; BIG4 is a dummy variable that equals 1 if the firm is audited by one of the Big 
4 audit firms, zero otherwise; OPA is the previous five years’ standard deviation of accrual quality value based 
on the Francis et al. (2005) model. 
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Table 2: Correlation table 
 
 
SYNCH CORRE L_SA LNUM SIZE LMB 
LEVERAG
E 
ROA NIND HERFSALE STDROA 
CORRE 0.847***           
L_SA 0.262*** 0.222*** 
         LNUM    0.41*** 0.393*** 0.398*** 
        SIZE    0.63*** 0.592*** 0.464*** 0.541*** 
       LMB 0.085*** 0.086*** 0.143*** 0.154*** 0.336*** 
      LEV 0.195*** 0.171*** 0.058*** 0.099*** 0.235*** 0.083*** 
     ROA 0.018*** 0.019*** 0.015***    0.006 0.037*** 0.115***   -0.010 
    NIND -0.153*** -0.109***   -0.1*** -0.134*** -0.127*** 0.028*** -0.181***   0.011* 
   HERFSALE 0.090*** 0.061*** 0.065*** 0.095*** 0.053*** -0.028*** 0.082***  -0.006 -0.74*** 
  STDROA -0.031*** -0.027***    0.003 -0.035*** -0.035*** 0.131*** -0.036*** 0.814*** 0.03*** -0.017*** 
 BIG4 0.408*** 0.402*** 0.203*** 0.315*** 0.544*** 0.161*** 0.197*** 0.019***  -0.167***  0.086*** -0.005 
 
 
Table 2 reports the Pearson correlation of variables used in the analysis. The sample contains 39,568 firm-year observations over the period 2004–2014. SYNCH, stock price 
synchronicity, is defined as the log-transformation of the adjusted R2of the firm-year estimation regressing weekly stock return on weekly market- and industry-level returns; 
CORRE is the percentage points of time-series Pearson correlation coefficient between weekly firm return and weekly market returns; L_SA is the natural log of 1 plus the 
number of single-ticker Seeking Alpha articles for a firm in the year; LNUM is the natural log of 1 plus the number of analysts following the firm for the previous fiscal year; 
SIZE is the natural log of the firm’s market capitalisation at the end of the last fiscal year; LMB is the natural log of market capitalisation scaled by the book value of equity 
at the end of the last fiscal year; LEVERAGE is the total long-term debt scaled by total assets at the end of the last fiscal year; ROA is income before extraordinary items 
divided by total assets at the end of the last fiscal year; NIND is the natural log of the number of firms in the industry to which firm i belongs at the end of the last fiscal year; 
HERFSALE is the sum of the squared terms of the proportion of a firm’s revenue to total revenue in the industry at the end of the last fiscal year; STDROA is the standard 
deviation of the ratio between income before extraordinary items and total assets in the previous five years; BIG4 is a dummy variable that equals 1 if the firm is audited by 
one of the Big 4 audit firms, zero otherwise; *, ** and *** denote significance levels at 10%, 5% and 1% respectively.
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Table 3: Baseline Model 
 
, 0 1 , 2 , 3 , 4 , 5 , 6 ,
7 , 8 , 9 , 10 , ,
_
4
i t i t i t i t i t i t i t
i t i t i t i t i i j j i t
Comovement L SA LNUM SIZE LMB LEVERAGE ROA
NIND HERFSALE STDROA BIG Firm Year
      
      
      
       
 
 
VARIABLES SYNCH SYNCH CORRE CORRE 
     
L_SA -0.055*** -0.059*** -0.450** -0.493*** 
 [-3.852] [-4.137] [-2.364] [-2.585] 
LNUM 0.141*** 0.122*** 1.153*** 0.972*** 
 [7.128] [6.083] [4.448] [3.683] 
SIZE 0.373*** 0.444*** 5.332*** 5.909*** 
 [23.917] [22.109] [27.081] [23.157] 
LMB  -0.142***  -1.158*** 
  [-6.701]  [-4.447] 
LEV  0.160  2.444** 
  [1.624]  [2.011] 
ROA  -0.037  -0.148 
  [-0.525]  [-0.174] 
NIND  -0.036  0.671 
  [-0.353]  [0.535] 
HERFSALE  0.411  -7.096 
  [0.807]  [-1.078] 
STDROA  0.015  0.574 
  [0.133]  [0.440] 
BIG4  0.061  0.603 
  [1.471]  [1.189] 
CONSTANT -5.273*** -5.474*** 3.369*** -2.920 
 [-53.159] [-9.843] [2.706] [-0.424] 
     
Observations 39,568 39,568 39,568 39,568 
R-squared 0.704 0.705 0.698 0.698 
firm fixed effects Yes Yes Yes Yes 
time fixed effects Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Adj. R-squared 0.648 0.649 0.641 0.641 
 
 
Table 3 presents the effect of Seeking Alpha coverage on stock return co-movement. The sample contains 39,568 firm-year observations 
over the period 2004–2014. SYNCH, stock price synchronicity, is defined as the log-transformation of the adjusted R2 of the firm-year 
estimation regressing weekly stock return on weekly market- and industry-level returns; CORRE is the percentage points of time-series 
Pearson correlation coefficient between weekly firm return and weekly market returns L_SA is the natural log of 1 plus the number of 
single-ticker Seeking Alpha articles for a firm in the year; LNUM is the natural log of 1 plus the number of analysts following the firm for 
the previous fiscal year; SIZE is the natural log of the firm’s market capitalisation at the end of the last fiscal year; LMB is the natural log of 
market capitalisation scaled by the book value of equity at the end of the last fiscal year; LEVERAGE is the total long-term debt scaled by 
total assets at the end of the last fiscal year; ROA is income before extraordinary items divided by total assets at the end of the last fiscal 
year; NIND is the natural log of the number of firms in the industry to which firm i belongs at the end of the last fiscal year; HERFSALE is 
the sum of the squared terms of the proportion of a firm’s revenue to total revenue in the industry at the end of the last fiscal year; STDROA 
is the standard deviation of the ratio between income before extraordinary items and total assets in the previous five years; BIG4 is a dummy 
variable that equals 1 if the firm is audited by one of the Big 4 audit firms, zero otherwise; T-statistics robust to heteroscedasticity and 
clustered by firm are reported in the square brackets;  *, ** and *** denote significance levels at 10%, 5% and 1% respectively. 
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Table 4: Results relating to moderating effect of financial reporting opacity 
 
, 0 1 , 2 , 3 , , 4 , 5 , 6 , 7 ,
8 , 9 , 10 , 11 , 12 , ,
_ _ *
4
i t i t i t i t i t i t i t i t i t
i t i t i t i t i t i i j j i t
Comovement L SA OPA L SA OPA LNUM SIZE LMB LEVERAGE
ROA NIND HERFSALE STDROA BIG Firm Year
       
       
       
        
 
 
VARIABLES SYNCH CORRE SYNCH CORRE 
     
L_SA -0.050*** -0.210 -0.070*** -0.541* 
 [-2.807] [-0.883] [-3.379] [-1.836] 
OPA -0.012 -0.460   
 [-0.109] [-0.392]   
OPA2   0.000*** 0.000 
   [3.616] [0.987] 
L_SA*OPA -0.143*** -1.939***   
 [-4.294] [-3.637]   
L_SA*OPA2   -0.071*** -0.435** 
   [-4.561] [-2.453] 
LNUM 0.117*** 0.993*** 0.071** 0.322 
 [4.413] [2.957] [2.195] [0.706] 
SIZE 0.412*** 5.203*** 0.359*** 3.594*** 
 [15.101] [15.196] [9.788] [7.419] 
LMB -0.138*** -0.806** -0.140*** -0.666 
 [-4.898] [-2.366] [-3.763] [-1.311] 
LEV 0.163 3.147** 0.230 2.941 
 [1.276] [1.973] [1.498] [1.438] 
ROA 0.030 1.394 0.228 3.500** 
 [0.331] [1.322] [1.639] [2.052] 
NIND -0.324** 0.015 -0.303* 1.591 
 [-2.166] [0.008] [-1.908] [0.670] 
HERFSALE 0.989 8.704 -0.366 -12.894 
 [1.288] [0.876] [-0.453] [-1.135] 
STDROA -0.009 2.033 -0.119 -1.905 
 [-0.057] [1.160] [-0.493] [-0.691] 
BIG4 0.069 0.942 0.083 0.955 
 [1.151] [1.254] [1.083] [0.974] 
CONSTANT -3.810*** 3.226 -3.212*** 12.313 
 [-4.668] [0.296] [-3.719] [0.976] 
     
Observations 22,847 22,847 12,606 12,606 
firm fixed effects Yes Yes Yes Yes 
time fixed effects Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Adj. R-squared 0.642 0.638 0.617 0.553 
 
Table 4 presents the results of varying effect of Seeking Alpha coverage on stock return co-movement with respect to Opacity. The sample contains 22,847 
(12,606) firm-year observations over the period 2004–2014 when SYNCH and CORRE are the dependent variable.17 SYNCH, stock price synchronicity, 
is defined as the log-transformation of the adjusted R2of the firm-year estimation regressing weekly stock return on weekly market- and industry-level 
returns; CORRE is the percentage points of time-series Pearson correlation coefficient between weekly firm return and weekly market returns;  L_SA is the 
natural log of 1 plus the number of single-ticker Seeking Alpha articles for a firm in the year; OPA is the previous five years standard deviation of Accrual 
quality value based on Francis et al (2005) model; OPA2 is the analyst earnings forecast dispersion scaled by the firm’s opening stock price of the fiscal 
year;  LNUM is the natural log of 1 plus the number of analysts following the firm for the previous fiscal year; SIZE is the natural log of the firm’s market 
capitalisation at the end of the last fiscal year; LMB is the natural log of market capitalisation scaled by the book value of equity at the end of the last fiscal 
year; LEVERAGE is the total long-term debt scaled by total assets at the end of the last fiscal year; ROA is income before extraordinary items divided by 
total assets at the end of the last fiscal year; NIND is the natural log of the number of firms in the industry to which firm i belongs at the end of the last fiscal 
year; HERFSALE is the sum of the squared terms of the proportion of a firm’s revenue to total revenue in the industry at the end of the last fiscal year; 
STDROA is the standard deviation of the ratio between income before extraordinary items and total assets in the previous five years; BIG4 is a dummy 
variable that equals 1 if the firm is audited by one of the Big 4 audit firms, zero otherwise. T-statistics robust to heteroscedasticity and clustered by firm are 
reported in the square brackets.  *, ** and *** denote significance levels at 10%, 5% and 1% respectively. 
                                                        
17 The sample size is reduced due to the availability of data required to calculate the variable OPA and OPA2. 
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Table 5: Propensity score matching 
 
VARIABLES SYNCH CORRE 
   
L_SA -0.055*** -1.133*** 
 [-3.138] [-5.111] 
LNUM 0.083*** 0.772** 
 [2.956] [2.208] 
SIZE 0.370*** 4.309*** 
 [13.106] [12.425] 
LMB -0.116*** -0.874*** 
 [-4.142] [-2.629] 
LEVERAGE 0.165 2.906 
 [1.144] [1.631] 
ROA 0.004** 0.082*** 
 [2.211] [3.782] 
NIND -0.045 -3.240* 
 [-0.329] [-1.691] 
HERFSALE -1.461** -28.209*** 
 [-2.302] [-3.681] 
STDROA -0.069*** -0.424*** 
 [-7.613] [-3.853] 
BIG4 0.010 -0.602 
 [0.134] [-0.644] 
CONSTANT -4.863*** 29.478*** 
 [-6.120] [2.775] 
   
Observations 21,528 21,528 
Firm fixed effects Yes Yes 
Year fixed effects Yes Yes 
Adj. R-squared 0.661 0.629 
 
Table 5 presents the effect of Seeking Alpha coverage on stock return co-movement for PSM matched sample. The sample contains 21,528 
firm-year observations over the period 2004–2014. SYNCH, stock price synchronicity, is defined as the log-transformation of the adjusted 
R2of the firm-year estimation regressing weekly stock return on weekly market- and industry-level returns; CORRE is the percentage 
points of time-series Pearson correlation coefficient between weekly firm return and weekly market returns;  L_SA is the natural log of 1 
plus the number of single-ticker Seeking Alpha articles for a firm in the year; LNUM is the natural log of 1 plus the number of analysts 
following the firm for the previous fiscal year; SIZE is the natural log of the firm’s market capitalisation at the end of the last fiscal year; 
LMB is the natural log of market capitalisation scaled by the book value of equity at the end of the last fiscal year; LEVERAGE is the total 
long-term debt scaled by total assets at the end of the last fiscal year; ROA is income before extraordinary items divided by total assets at the 
end of the last fiscal year; NIND is the natural log of the number of firms in the industry to which firm i belongs at the end of the last fiscal 
year; HERFSALE is the sum of the squared terms of the proportion of a firm’s revenue to total revenue in the industry at the end of the last 
fiscal year; STDROA is the standard deviation of the ratio between income before extraordinary items and total assets in the previous five 
years; BIG4 is a dummy variable that equals one if the firm is audited by one of the Big 4 audit firms, zero otherwise. Both firm and year 
fixed effects are used. T-statistics robust to heteroscedasticity and clustered by firm are reported in the square brackets. *, ** and *** denote 
significance levels at 10%, 5% and 1% respectively. 
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Table 6: Two-stage-least-square (2SLS) 
 
 First stage Second stage Second stage 
VARIABLES  SYNCH CORRE 
    
L_SA_IND 0.029***   
 [11.617]   
L_ADX 0.038***   
 [3.058]   
L_SA_P  -0.472** -11.544*** 
  [-2.450] [-4.478] 
LNUM 0.043*** 0.141*** 1.480*** 
 [3.534] [6.688] [4.848] 
SIZE 0.119*** 0.496*** 7.284*** 
 [12.018] [16.306] [17.903] 
LMB -0.035*** -0.159*** -1.613*** 
 [-3.345] [-7.478] [-5.696] 
LEVERAGE 0.216*** 0.251** 4.886*** 
 [4.948] [2.480] [3.605] 
ROA 0.019 -0.032 0.004 
 [0.709] [-0.481] [0.005] 
NIND 0.166*** 0.040 2.705** 
 [3.377] [0.390] [1.999] 
HERFSALE 0.773** 0.715 1.023 
 [2.532] [1.443] [0.143] 
STDROA 0.127*** 0.071 2.054 
 [2.621] [0.649] [1.571] 
BIG4 0.056*** 0.084** 1.227** 
 [3.959] [2.119] [2.435] 
    
Observations 38,821 38,821 38,821 
Firm fixed effects Yes Yes Yes 
Time fixed effects Yes Yes Yes 
Adj. R-squared 0.592 0.640 0.588 
 
Table 6 presents the two-stage least square (2SLS) analysis results. We use two instrumental variables: L_ADX is the natural log of 1 plus 
the firm’s annual advertisement expenditure; L_SA_IND is the natural log of 1 plus the total annual SA coverage of the industry to which 
the firm belongs. The sample contains 38,821 firm-year observations over the period 2004–2014. SYNCH, stock price synchronicity, is 
defined as the log-transformation of the adjusted R2 of the firm-year estimation regressing weekly stock return on weekly market- and 
industry level return; CORRE is the percentage points of time-series Pearson correlation coefficient between weekly firm return and weekly 
market returns; L_SA is the natural log of 1 plus the number of single-ticker Seeking Alpha articles for a firm in the year; L_SA_P is the 
predicted value of L_SA from the first stage. LNUM is the natural log of 1 plus the number of analysts following the firm for the previous 
fiscal year; SIZE is the natural log of the firm’s market capitalisation at the end of the last fiscal year; LMB is the natural log of market 
capitalisation scaled by the book value of equity at the end of the last fiscal year; LEVERAGE is the total long-term debt scaled by total 
assets at the end of the last fiscal year; ROA is income before extraordinary items divided by total assets at the end of the last fiscal year; 
NIND is the natural log of the number of firms in the industry to which firm i belongs at the end of the last fiscal year; HERFSALE is the 
sum of the squared terms of the proportion of a firm’s revenue to total revenue in the industry at the end of the last fiscal year; STDROA is 
the standard deviation of the ratio between income before extraordinary items and total assets in the previous five years; BIG4 is a dummy 
variable that equals 1 if the firm is audited by one of the Big 4 audit firms, zero otherwise. Both firm and year fixed effects are used. T-
statistics robust to heteroscedasticity and clustered by firm are reported in the square brackets. *, ** and *** denote significance levels at 
10%, 5% and 1% respectively. 
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Table 7: Loss of Seeking Alpha coverage 
 
 Baseline 
Exogenous 
drop 
Baseline 
Exogenous 
drop 
VARIABLES SYNCH SYNCH CORRE CORRE 
     
L_SA -0.187*** -0.185*** -2.330*** -2.315*** 
 [-11.963] [-11.852] [-14.323] [-14.258] 
L_SA_DROP  0.162**  1.875* 
  [2.033]  [1.871] 
LNUM 0.112*** 0.112*** 1.074*** 1.073*** 
 [4.573] [4.570] [4.868] [4.862] 
SIZE 0.786*** 0.786*** 5.848*** 5.847*** 
 [32.231] [32.239] [27.155] [27.178] 
LMB 0.044** 0.044** 0.311* 0.308* 
 [2.236] [2.222] [1.694] [1.680] 
LEV -0.219* -0.218* -0.726 -0.709 
 [-1.831] [-1.821] [-0.724] [-0.707] 
ROA -0.001 -0.001 4.646*** 4.651*** 
 [-0.081] [-0.082] [6.692] [6.699] 
NIND -0.166 -0.166 -1.021 -1.029 
 [-1.544] [-1.548] [-1.121] [-1.130] 
HERFSALE 0.867 0.866 -6.266 -6.260 
 [1.488] [1.487] [-1.145] [-1.144] 
STDROA -0.025 -0.025 0.242 0.244 
 [-1.188] [-1.187] [0.242] [0.245] 
BIG4 -0.077 -0.077 0.390 0.394 
 [-1.234] [-1.232] [0.792] [0.799] 
     
Observations 108,333 108,333 112,346 112,346 
firm fixed effects Yes Yes Yes Yes 
time fixed effects Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Adj. R-squared 0.665 0.665 0.675 0.675 
 
Table 7 presents the effect of Seeking Alpha coverage on stock return co-movement using quarterly data. SYNCH, stock price 
synchronicity, is defined as the log-transformation of the adjusted R2 of the firm-quarter estimation regressing daily stock return on daily 
market and industry level return; CORRE is the percentage points of time-series Pearson correlation coefficient between daily firm return 
and daily market returns; L_SA is the natural log of 1 plus the number of single-ticker Seeking Alpha articles for a firm in the quarter; 
L_SA_DROP is the natural log of 1 plus the number of exogenous drop of single-ticker Seeking Alpha articles for a firm in the quarter 
caused by influential authors; LNUM is the natural log of 1 plus the number of analysts following the firm for the previous fiscal year; SIZE 
is the natural log of the firm’s market capitalisation at the end of the last fiscal year; LMB is the natural log of market capitalisation scaled 
by the book value of equity at the end of the last fiscal year; LEVERAGE is total long-term debt scaled by total assets at the end of the last 
fiscal year; ROA is income before extraordinary items divided by total assets at the end of the last fiscal year; NIND is the natural log of the 
number of firms in the industry to which firm i belongs at the end of the last fiscal year; HERFSALE is the sum of the squared terms of the 
proportion of a firm’s revenue to total revenue in the industry at the end of the last fiscal year; STDROA is the standard deviation of the 
ratio between income before extraordinary items and total assets in the previous five years; BIG4 is a dummy variable that equals 1 if the 
firm is audited by one of the Big 4 audit firms, zero otherwise. T-statistics robust to heteroscedasticity and clustered by firm are reported in 
the square brackets.  *, ** and *** denote significance levels at 10%, 5% and 1% respectively. 
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Table 8: “Day of the Week” effect 
 
VARIABLES SYNCH CORRE 
   
L_SA_WEEKENDS -0.079*** -1.204*** 
 [-3.529] [-5.397] 
L_SA_WEEKDAY -0.167*** -2.048*** 
 [-9.963] [-12.239] 
LNUM 0.112*** 1.031*** 
 [4.567] [4.645] 
SIZE 0.786*** 6.193*** 
 [32.228] [30.549] 
LMB 0.044** 0.139 
 [2.221] [0.838] 
LEV -0.219* -0.975 
 [-1.829] [-0.961] 
ROA -0.001 0.103* 
 [-0.085] [1.895] 
NIND -0.167 -1.184 
 [-1.558] [-1.309] 
HERFSALE 0.865 -6.036 
 [1.485] [-1.324] 
STDROA -0.025 -0.211 
 [-1.183] [-1.534] 
BIG4 -0.077 0.329 
 [-1.233] [0.658] 
   
Observations 108,333 112,346 
firm fixed effects Yes Yes 
time fixed effects Yes Yes 
Adj. R-squared 0.665 0.674 
 
Table 8 presents the effect of Seeking Alpha coverage on stock return co-movement using quarterly data. SYNCH, stock price 
synchronicity, is defined as the log-transformation of the adjusted R2 of the firm-quarter estimation regressing daily stock return on daily 
market and industry level return; CORRE is the percentage points of time-series Pearson correlation coefficient between daily firm return 
and daily market returns; L_SA_WEEKENDS is the natural log of 1 plus the number of single-ticker Seeking Alpha articles posted on 
Friday, Saturday and Sunday for a firm in the quarter; L_SA_WEEKDAY is the natural log of 1 plus the number of single-ticker Seeking 
Alpha articles posted from Monday to Thursday for a firm in the quarter; LNUM is the natural log of 1 plus the number of analysts 
following the firm for the previous fiscal year; SIZE is the natural log of the firm’s market capitalisation at the end of the last fiscal year; 
LMB is the natural log of market capitalisation scaled by the book value of equity at the end of the last fiscal year; LEVERAGE is total 
long-term debt scaled by total assets at the end of the last fiscal year; ROA is income before extraordinary items divided by total assets at the 
end of the last fiscal year; NIND is the natural log of the number of firms in the industry to which firm i belongs at the end of the last fiscal 
year; HERFSALE is the sum of the squared terms of the proportion of a firm’s revenue to total revenue in the industry at the end of the last 
fiscal year; STDROA is the standard deviation of the ratio between income before extraordinary items and total assets in the previous five 
years; BIG4 is a dummy variable that equals 1 if the firm is audited by one of the Big 4 audit firms, zero otherwise. T-statistics robust to 
heteroscedasticity and clustered by firm are reported in the square brackets.  *, ** and *** denote significance levels at 10%, 5% and 1% 
respectively. 
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Table 9: Incorporation of future earnings into current stock price 
 
 4(a) 4(b) Wald Test of 
coefficient 
difference 
VARIABLES Ret1 Ret2 
    
EARNING 2.186*** 5.214***  
 [10.474] [16.949]  
L_SA 0.051*** 0.087***  
 [7.995] [8.565]  
EARNING*L_SA 0.012*** 0.056*** 0.044*** 
 [3.342] [6.972] [23.07] 
LNUM 0.056*** 0.075***  
 [12.006] [10.523]  
EARNING*LNUM -0.043*** -0.104***  
 [-5.925] [-7.421]  
SIZE -0.077*** -0.152***  
 [-25.274] [-34.164]  
EARNING*SIZE 0.041*** 0.077***  
 [5.558] [6.393]  
LMB -0.160*** -0.222***  
 [-29.072] [-27.075]  
EARNING*LMB 0.015*** 0.022***  
 [3.053] [3.061]  
LEVERAGE 0.337*** 0.572***  
 [12.491] [14.083]  
EARNING*LEVERAGE 0.961*** 1.926***  
 [7.209] [9.711]  
ROA -0.042*** -0.115***  
 [-3.900] [-5.938]  
EARNING*ROA 0.000 0.001***  
 [0.179] [3.027]  
NIND -0.001 0.009  
 [-0.110] [1.076]  
EARNING* NIND -0.373*** -0.854***  
 [-11.926] [-18.372]  
HERFSALE -0.081 0.060  
 [-1.002] [0.483]  
EARNING*HERFSALE 0.356 -3.135***  
 [0.594] [-3.482]  
STDROA 0.054*** 0.057***  
 [5.019] [4.460]  
EARNING*STDROA -0.001*** -0.005***  
 [-3.221] [-5.861]  
BIG4 0.133*** 0.321***  
 [11.979] [19.500]  
EARNING*BIG4 0.042* 0.112***  
 [1.764] [3.237]  
CONSTANT 1.506*** 1.955***  
 [39.930] [34.206]  
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Observations 34,866 34,866  
Adj. R-squared 0.024 0.086  
 
Table 9 presents the results on whether firms with higher Seeking Alpha coverage incorporate future earnings into their prices more 
efficiently. We estimate the system of Equations 10(a) and 10(b) using Seemingly Unrelated Regression (SUR). RET1 is the return from the 
previous year and RET2 is the previous two years’ return; EARNINGS is the income before extraordinary items divided by total assets; 
L_SA is the natural log of 1 plus the number of single-ticker Seeking Alpha articles for a firm in the year; LNUM is the natural log of 1 plus 
the number of analysts following the firm for the previous fiscal year; SIZE is the natural log of the firm’s market capitalisation at the end of 
the last fiscal year; LMB is the natural log of market capitalisation scaled by the book value of equity at the end of the last fiscal year; 
LEVERAGE is the total long-term debt scaled by total assets at the end of the last fiscal year; ROA is income before extraordinary items 
divided by total assets at the end of the last fiscal year; NIND is the natural log of the number of firms in the industry to which firm i 
belongs at the end of the last fiscal year; HERFSALE is the sum of the squared terms of the proportion of a firm’s revenue to total revenue 
in the industry at the end of the last fiscal year; STDROA is the standard deviation of the ratio between income before extraordinary items 
and total assets in the previous five years; BIG4 is a dummy variable that equals 1 if the firm is audited by one of the Big 4 audit firms, zero 
otherwise. We report the Wald test results on the difference of coefficients on EARNINGS*L_SA between two equations. *, ** and *** 
denote significance levels at 10%, 5% and 1% respectively. 
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Table 10: Analysis comparing post-2011 and pre-2011 period 
 
VARIABLES SYNCH CORRE 
   
L_SA 0.198 -0.557 
 [1.503] [-0.407] 
POST -0.207 1.247 
 [-0.579] [0.241] 
L_SA*POST -0.140*** -3.652*** 
 [-3.720] [-3.056] 
LNUM 0.187*** 2.377*** 
 [11.175] [8.801] 
SIZE 0.584*** 6.338*** 
 [34.502] [26.656] 
LMB -0.383*** -3.908*** 
 [-8.430] [-8.464] 
LEV 0.470*** 3.913** 
 [4.685] [2.477] 
ROA -0.174 0.222 
 [-1.405] [0.130] 
NIND -0.021 0.126 
 [-0.737] [0.317] 
HERFSALE 1.227*** 7.279* 
 [3.155] [1.689] 
STDROA 0.583*** 6.527*** 
 [3.601] [2.754] 
BIG4 0.233*** 4.522*** 
 [4.263] [5.784] 
CONSTANT -6.374*** -2.850 
 [-20.076] [-0.776] 
   
Observations 39,568 39,568 
Firm clustering Yes Yes 
Time clustering Yes Yes 
Adj. R-squared 0.449 0.393 
 
Table 10 presents results comparing the effect of Seeking Alpha coverage on co-movement between post-2011 and pre-2011 period. The 
sample contains 39,568 firm-year observations over the period 2004–2014. SYNCH, stock price synchronicity, is defined as the log-
transformation of the adjusted R2of the firm-year estimation regressing weekly stock return on weekly market- and industry-level returns; 
CORRE is the percentage points of time-series Pearson correlation coefficient between weekly firm returns and the weekly market returns;  
L_SA is the natural log of 1 plus the number of single-ticker Seeking Alpha articles for a firm in the year; POST is a time dummy which 
equals to 1 for observations after 2011 and 0 otherwise; LNUM is the natural log of 1 plus the number of analysts following the firm for the 
previous fiscal year; SIZE is the natural log of the firm’s market capitalisation at the end of the last fiscal year; LMB is the natural log of 
market capitalisation scaled by the book value of equity at the end of the last fiscal year; LEVERAGE is the total long-term debt scaled by 
total assets at the end of the last fiscal year; ROA is income before extraordinary items divided by total assets at the end of the last fiscal 
year; NIND is the natural log of the number of firms in the industry to which firm i belongs at the end of the last fiscal year; HERFSALE is 
the sum of the squared terms of the proportion of a firm’s revenue to total revenue in the industry at the end of the last fiscal year; STDROA 
is the standard deviation of the ratio between income before extraordinary items and total assets in the previous five years; BIG4 is a dummy 
variable that equals one if the firm is audited by one of the Big 4 audit firms, zero otherwise. T-statistics robust to heteroscedasticity and 
clustered by firm and year are reported in the square brackets. *, ** and *** denote significance levels at 10%, 5% and 1% respectively. 
 
